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TITLE VII DISPARATE IMPACT
SUITS AGAINST STATE GOVERNMENTS
AFTER HIBBS AND LANE
CLAUDE PLATTON
INTRODUCTION
The disparate impact theory of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
1
of 1964 enables employees and job applicants to challenge
employment practices that, although neutral on their face, have a
disproportionate, adverse effect on the basis of race, sex, or national
origin.2 It permits challenges to a wide variety of employment
practices—including standardized tests, diploma requirements, height
and weight requirements, and subjective evaluations—that have stood
in the way of equal access to the workplace and to advancement.3 The
theory has been available to private- and public-sector employees
alike since 1973.4
In recent years, the Supreme Court’s “federalism revolution” has
narrowed Congress’s ability to override state sovereign immunity
with civil rights legislation.5 As a result, whether Congress retains the
power to authorize Title VII suits against state governments has

Copyright © 2005 by Claude Platton.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000). Title VII targets discrimination on the basis of
race, national origin, sex, and religion in the employment context. Id. § 2000e-2(a). Religious
discrimination presents unique issues and is not discussed in this Note.
2. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4.01, at 235 (3d ed. 2002). The other major theory under Title VII is disparate
treatment, which requires proof of intent to discriminate. Id.
3. Id. § 4.02, at 249–53.
4. Congress extended Title VII to state and local government employment as part of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 701, 86 Stat. 103, 103
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1972)).
5. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7 (2001)
(discussing the Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence, including its expansion of state
sovereign immunity).
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6
become uncertain. The Court recognized in 1976, in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, that Title VII abrogates state sovereign immunity.7 Although
several subsequent federalism decisions have reaffirmed that
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity through its
enforcement power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment,8 the stringent abrogation analysis applied in those cases
undermined the holding in Fitzpatrick and cast doubt upon Title VII’s
9
future as a remedy for state employment discrimination.
10
In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, however,
the Supreme Court, for the first time since reinvigorating the state
sovereign immunity doctrine, upheld a federal statute against a
sovereign immunity challenge, concluding that state employees could
sue their employers for violating the family-leave provision of the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).11 The following year, in
12
Tennessee v. Lane, the Court upheld the private suit provision of
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against a state
sovereign immunity challenge.13 Because of the similarities between
these statutes and Title VII, commentators have concluded that these
cases put Title VII’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity on much
firmer doctrinal footing.14 It is less clear, however, that these cases
15
authorize disparate impact suits against state governments. Because
disparate impact liability arises from conduct that would not be

6. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.01, at 244; Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002
Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 19–21 (2003).
7. 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (citing Fitzpatrick for the proposition that “the Eleventh Amendment, and
the principle of state sovereign immunity which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 80 (2000) (same); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (same).
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
11. Id. at 740.
12. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
13. Id. at 533–34.
14. See, e.g., Post, supra note 6, at 21–23 (discussing the import of Hibbs for Title VII).
15. See, e.g., Nicole E. Grodner, Note, Disparate Impact Legislation and Abrogation of the
States’ Sovereign Immunity After Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs and
Tennessee v. Lane, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1173, 1212–23 (2005) (arguing that Title VII’s disparate
impact theory does not abrogate state sovereign immunity after Hibbs and Lane).
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16
unconstitutional under equal protection analysis, the theory may
exceed Congress’s remedial power under Section Five even if other
aspects of Title VII do not.
This Note argues that Hibbs and Lane establish beyond
peradventure that Title VII’s disparate impact theory validly
abrogates state sovereign immunity. Far from doctrinal aberrations,
these two cases carry forward suggestions in the Supreme Court’s
earlier state sovereign immunity cases that racial, gender, and
national-origin discrimination call for a different, more nuanced
abrogation analysis—one that recognizes that discrimination takes
many forms and that is more deferential to Congress’s chosen means
of responding to it. Under the logic of Hibbs and Lane, Title VII’s
disparate impact provision is an appropriate legislative response to
this country’s long history of discrimination against women and racial
and ethnic minorities, and it applies to government and private
employers alike.
Part I of this Note provides background, briefly describing both
the Supreme Court’s state sovereign immunity jurisprudence and
Title VII disparate impact claims. It also discusses several pre-Hibbs
lower court decisions considering whether Title VII disparate impact
claims abrogate state sovereign immunity. Part II explains that Title
VII satisfies the first of the two major requirements for abrogation,
that Congress enacted the legislation in response to a pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination. It also considers why the Court in
Hibbs announced a new way of assessing the sufficiency of the
legislative record. Finally, Part III shows that disparate impact
satisfies the second major requirement for abrogation, that the
remedy chosen be congruent and proportional to the pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination. Although the disparate impact
theory prohibits conduct that is not itself unconstitutional, Hibbs and
Lane signal that Congress may enact broad prophylactic legislation to
prevent infringement of rights that receive heightened scrutiny. Part
III also argues that defining the disparate impact theory broadly,
rather than merely as a remedy for intentional discrimination, is
essential if the theory is to achieve remedial objectives.

16. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that equal protection
claims require proof of discriminatory intent).
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I. BACKGROUND: STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AND DISPARATE IMPACT
This Part first outlines the requirements for congressional
abrogation of state sovereign immunity, focusing on the aspects of the
analysis most relevant to evaluating the disparate impact theory. It
then briefly describes the theory and some key statutory features.
Finally, it reviews several lower court decisions that, in the wake of
the Supreme Court’s pre-Hibbs state sovereign immunity decisions,
grappled with the question of whether Title VII, and specifically its
disparate impact provision, could abrogate the states’ newly
strengthened sovereign immunity.
A. Congressional Power and State Sovereign Immunity
Congress may override the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity17 to suits for money damages only when it legislates
pursuant to its power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
18
Amendment. Congress’s Section Five power, however, only
authorizes legislation that “enforces” the guarantees of Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment as the Supreme Court itself has
defined them.19 The Court has rebuffed congressional efforts to
increase the level of protection that rights would receive under
Section One, explaining that Congress may not use its remedial
powers to “redefine” the meaning of the amendment.20 The Court has
17. The Eleventh Amendment provides, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XI. The Supreme Court has held that the Amendment also applies to suits by
citizens against their own states. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363
(2001); see id. (“The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting
States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.”).
18. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 72–73 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to
its power under the Commerce Clause). Title VII’s application to private employers is an
exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.3, at 257–58 (2d ed. 2002).; cf.
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (holding that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as applied to a private business, was a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause
power); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 (1964) (same).
19. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
20. The Court has held that several federal antidiscrimination statutes are not valid
exercises of Congress’s Section Five power. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (Title I of the ADA);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)).
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developed a three-step inquiry with which to determine whether a
statute authorizing private suits against state governments is valid
21
Section Five legislation. These steps are as follows: first, identify the
22
right at issue; second, determine whether there is a “history and
pattern” of state discrimination infringing this right;23 and third, assess
whether Congress’s chosen remedy is a “congruent and proportional”
24
response to this history and pattern of discrimination. This Section
will briefly consider the first step of the inquiry and then turn to the
second and third steps in greater detail.
The first step identifies “with some precision” the right that the
statute aims to protect and determines the level of scrutiny that courts
show to the right.25 The Court has invalidated two antidiscrimination
statutes protecting rights that courts review under a rational basis
standard. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,26 the Court concluded
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) implicated
the right to be free of unconstitutional age discrimination, a right that
receives only rational basis review.27 Similarly, in Board of Trustees of
28
the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court held that Title I of
the ADA implicated the right to be free of disability discrimination,
which also receives rational basis review.29 In both cases, the Court
noted that under this minimal standard of review, a court would find
very little discriminatory conduct unconstitutional—only conduct that
is “irrational.”30
In contrast, the Court upheld two statutes in which the right at
issue received heightened scrutiny. In Hibbs, the Court determined
that the FMLA’s family-leave provision aimed to protect “the right to

21. An additional requirement is that Congress must have made unmistakably clear its
intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73. This requirement is not at
issue with respect to Title VII, which clearly was intended to apply to the states. Fitzpatrick, 427
U.S. at 447.
22. See infra notes 25–34 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part I.A.1.
24. See infra Part I.A.2.
25. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
26. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
27. Id. at 83.
28. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
29. Id. at 366–68.
30. Id. at 368; see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (“States may discriminate on the basis of age
without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.”).
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31
be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace,” and in
Lane, it held that Title II of the ADA implicated the right to be free
of disability discrimination that would infringe the fundamental right
32
of access to the courts. Because the rights at issue in these cases
receive heightened scrutiny, a great deal of conduct that infringes
them would be unconstitutional.33 The level of scrutiny the right
receives is crucially important to the second and third steps of the
abrogation inquiry.

1. The Requirement of a History and Pattern of Discrimination.
In the second step, courts review a statute’s legislative record to
determine whether it contains sufficient evidence of a history and
pattern of discrimination to justify remedial legislation abrogating
state sovereign immunity.34 When the right implicated by the statute is
one that courts review under a rational basis standard, the record
review is stringent and courts approach the evidence of
unconstitutional state conduct skeptically. In Garrett, the Court
credited only legislative evidence directly demonstrating disability
discrimination by the states.35 It rejected, as irrelevant, evidence of
disability discrimination in the private sector and in local government
employment.36 Moreover, when rational basis review is implicated,
the evidence of unconstitutional state conduct must be extensive and
clear. For example, the Court concluded in Garrett that Congress had
documented relatively few incidents of unconstitutional
discrimination, despite holding extensive hearings on disability
discrimination, and that these few incidents failed to establish a
pattern of state discrimination.37 The Court also discounted a number

31. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003).
32. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522–23 (2004).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“Parties who seek to
defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive
justification’ for that action.”).
34. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
35. Id. at 369.
36. Id. Similarly, the Court discounted evidence of unconstitutional state conduct in public
accommodations, which it considered irrelevant because Title I specifically addresses disability
discrimination in employment. Id. at 371 n.7.
37. See id. at 370 (noting that Congress had found, in enacting the ADA, that 43 million
Americans have one or more disabilities and that in 1990 state governments employed 4.5
million people, and observing that “[i]t is telling, we think, that given these large numbers,
Congress assembled only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in
employment against the disabled”).

042706 04__PLATTON.DOC

2005]

5/23/2006 8:45 AM

DISPARATE IMPACT SUITS

647

of incidents of discrimination against disabled state employees
because it found them insufficiently detailed to permit the conclusion
that they described irrational, unconstitutional conduct rather than
38
rational unwillingness to make accommodations. Similarly, the
Court concluded in Kimel that Congress had not documented
sufficient evidence of age discrimination by state employers to justify
39
a legislative remedy. It made a similar determination in City of
40
Boerne v. Flores regarding state infringement of the right to free
exercise of religion.41
Review of the legislative record is less stringent when Congress
seeks to protect a right that courts review under a heightened-scrutiny
standard. In Hibbs, the FMLA satisfied the record requirement even
though the evidence before Congress of unconstitutional genderbased discrimination in the administration of leave benefits was not
significantly more extensive or detailed than the evidence found
inadequate in Garrett.42 The Court credited evidence that it would
have rejected under Garrett, such as gender-based disparities in
43
private-sector family-leave policies. It also validated Congress’s
concern that “stereotype-based beliefs about the allocation of family
duties” produce such disparities.44 As Justice Kennedy objected in
dissent, little of this evidence directly established that the states were
45
responsible for unconstitutional discrimination. Similarly, in Lane,
the Court relied upon “statistical, legislative, and anecdotal evidence
of the widespread exclusion of persons with disabilities from the
enjoyment of public services” without inquiring as deeply as it had in
38. Id.
39. See 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (“A review of the ADEA’s legislative record as a whole . . .
reveals that Congress had virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of age.”).
40. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
41. Id. at 530 (“RFRA’s legislative record lacks examples of modern instances of generally
applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry.”).
42. In Lane, the Court noted that the legislative record supporting the FMLA in Hibbs
“contained little specific evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on the part of
the States.” 541 U.S. 509, 528 n.16 (2004).
43. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730–31 (2003) (attributing
disparities in private-sector leave policies to public-sector employment on the basis of evidence
before Congress that public-sector and private-sector leave policies were substantially similar).
44. Id. at 730.
45. Id. at 749–50 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Lane, 541 U.S. at 519 (“We upheld the
FMLA as a valid exercise of Congress’ § 5 power to combat unconstitutional sex discrimination,
even though there was no suggestion that the State’s leave policy was adopted or applied with a
discriminatory purpose.”).
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Garrett whether this evidence proved unconstitutional conduct by the
46
states.
In both Hibbs and Lane, the Court referred to its own prior
decisions involving the right implicated by the statute and read these
cases as further evidence of a history and pattern of discrimination. In
Hibbs, the Court used its jurisprudence to help establish that
Congress was justified in enacting legislation to combat gender
47
discrimination. Lane reviewed prior cases dealing with state
discrimination against the disabled and found that they documented
“pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state services
and programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental
48
rights” that supported the enactment of the ADA. As the Court
explained in Hibbs, the history and pattern of state constitutional
violations that the record-review inquiry seeks to uncover is closely
related to heightened scrutiny under equal protection.49 Affording a
right the protection of heightened scrutiny, then, is the Court’s own
response to clear evidence of a history and pattern of government
discrimination against a protected group. The fact of heightened
scrutiny, therefore, resolves in advance the question that the record
review seeks to answer;50 thus, a more deferential, less exacting form
of review is appropriate for legislation protecting rights that receive
heightened scrutiny.

46. 541 U.S. at 529.
47. 538 U.S. at 730, 736.
48. 541 U.S. at 524.
49. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730 (“The long and extensive history of sex discrimination
prompted us to hold that measures that differentiate on the basis of gender warrant heightened
scrutiny.”). The Court had already acknowledged the history of race and gender discrimination
and, in Kimel, drawn a link between this history and heightened scrutiny. Contrasting the
heightened scrutiny shown to race and gender classifications with the more relaxed scrutiny
applied to classifications based on age, the Court in Kimel made the following observation:
“Older persons, . . . unlike those who suffer discrimination on the basis of race or gender, have
not been subjected to a ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment.’” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (quoting Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)).
50. Note that this analysis formulates the right at a higher level of abstraction than
authorized under Kimel and Garrett. That is, the Court did not consider whether its
jurisprudence revealed a history of gender-based discrimination in employment. Instead, it
considered gender-based discrimination generally. This less-precise analysis is easy to criticize if
one starts from the assumption that the Court was performing the same analysis in Hibbs as in
Garrett. This more abstracted form of analysis makes more sense, however, if, as discussed in
Part II.B. infra, the Court was really establishing a different form of record review for rights that
receive heightened scrutiny.
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2. The Congruence and Proportionality Requirement. The third
step of the abrogation inquiry considers whether Congress’s chosen
remedy is congruent and proportional to the history and pattern of
51
discrimination. This inquiry distinguishes between legislation that
remedies violations of constitutional rights and legislation that
attempts to redefine the scope of the right itself.52 To deter or remedy
violations of a right effectively, Congress may prohibit some conduct
that would not itself be held unconstitutional under equal protection
doctrine.53 A statute that prohibits a great deal of conduct that would
not be unconstitutional, however, may be out of proportion to the
constitutional violation it purports to remedy and may instead
represent an attempt to redefine the right itself.54 Applying the
congruence and proportionality test, the Supreme Court has held that
the ADEA and ADA are not congruent and proportional responses
to unconstitutional state discrimination against, respectively, older
persons and persons with disabilities.55 In Kimel, the Court
invalidated the ADEA’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity
because it “prohibit[ed] substantially more state employment
decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional
under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard.”56
Rather than enforcing the constitutional prohibition on age
discrimination in employment, the ADEA “effectively elevated the
standard for analyzing age discrimination to heightened scrutiny.”57
The Court analyzed Title I of the ADA in Garrett similarly: by
prohibiting disability discrimination and mandating accommodation
of employees’ disabilities, Title I prohibited far more conduct than
would be unconstitutional under equal protection analysis and
imposed a significant burden on state governments.58

51. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
52. Id. In Boerne, the Court invalidated RFRA, which had mandated strict scrutiny for
facially neutral laws that substantially burdened the free exercise of religion. RFRA would have
worked a dramatic change in the protection afforded to the free exercise right and could have
affected every aspect of state government operations. Id. at 532. Thus, it was not remedial
legislation because it was grossly disproportionate to the relatively insignificant problem of
facially neutral laws burdening the exercise of religion. Id.
53. Id. at 518.
54. Id. at 518–20.
55. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372–73 (2001); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–83 (2000).
56. 528 U.S. at 86.
57. Id. at 88.
58. 531 U.S. at 372.
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When the statute in question aims to protect a right that receives
heightened scrutiny, however, Congress has significantly greater
latitude to prohibit conduct that would not be unconstitutional. In
Hibbs, the Court upheld the provision of the FMLA authorizing
private suits against state employers for failing to provide twelve
weeks of unpaid leave annually to employees caring for ill spouses,
59
children, or parents. The Court concluded that the provision was
appropriate remedial legislation because it targeted the “formerly
state-sanctioned stereotype that only women are responsible for
family caregiving” that had led employers to discriminate against
women in hiring and promotion.60 In Lane, the Court sanctioned
another remedy against state governments: Title II of the ADA’s
requirement that states accommodate disabilities if failing to do so
would burden disabled persons’ fundamental right of access to the
courts.61
B. Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision
Broadly speaking, there are two theories of liability under Title
62
VII. The first theory, disparate treatment, prohibits intentional
discrimination;63 liability requires proof of discriminatory animus.64
Under the second theory, disparate impact, an employer may be
liable if it makes use of an employment practice that, although
seemingly neutral, has a disproportionately adverse effect on one of
65
the groups protected by the statute. The employer need not have

59. 538 U.S. at 724–25.
60. Id. at 737.
61. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531–34, 532 n.20 (2004). In Lane, the respondents
were paraplegics unable to access courthouses that were not wheelchair accessible. Id. at 513–
14. Respondent Lane was unable to appear in court to face criminal charges and had to crawl up
two flights of stairs. Id. at 514. Respondent Jones was a court reporter who was unable to access
a number of county courthouses, and thus she “lost both work and an opportunity to participate
in the judicial process.” Id.
62. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 38.
63. Id.
64. See id. (“Intent, purpose, or state of mind is crucial to . . . disparate treatment
[claims].”).
65. See id. at 43 (“The Supreme Court has said that disparate impact discrimination
‘involve[s] employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity.’” (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977))).
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been motivated by discriminatory animus; what matters is the
66
practice’s effect.
The disparate impact theory was not explicitly part of Title VII
67
as originally enacted. Rather, the Supreme Court established the
theory in 1971, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,68 based upon its
69
understanding of the language and purpose of the statute. The
theory was used for several decades, with Griggs as its doctrinal
underpinning, until Congress codified it as part of Title VII in the
Civil Rights Act of 199170 in response to several Supreme Court
decisions significantly narrowing the theory’s scope.71 As enacted in
1964, Title VII did not apply to state and local government
employers; Congress amended the statute to cover them as part of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA).72
Griggs involved a Title VII disparate treatment suit by AfricanAmerican employees who challenged their employer’s practice of
requiring high school diplomas and intelligence tests for placement in
73
any but its lowest-paying department. The employer had openly
discriminated against African-American employees prior to the
effective date of Title VII and had added the intelligence-test and
diploma requirements on the day Title VII went into effect.74 These
requirements had the effect of disproportionately limiting AfricanAmerican employees to the lowest-paying department, thus

66. See id. (“Proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not required under a disparate impact
theory.” (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977))).
67. Id. § 1.03, at 5.
68. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
69. See id. at 429–30 (“The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees
over other employees.”); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982) (“When an
employer uses a non-job-related barrier in order to deny a minority or woman applicant
employment or promotion, and that barrier has a significant adverse effect on minorities or
women, then the applicant has been deprived of an employment opportunity ‘because of . . .
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Civil Rights Act of
1964 § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000)).
70. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 703, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074–75 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2000)).
71. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court significantly
weakened the disparate impact theory. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.01, at 240–41.
72. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 701, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2000)).
73. 401 U.S. at 427–28.
74. Id.
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preserving the effects of the company’s pre–Title VII discriminatory
75
practices. Nevertheless, the district court found that the company
had no intention to discriminate, and it dismissed the plaintiffs’
76
claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Title VII
“proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is
business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited.”77 The employer had failed to show that
either its diploma or intelligence-test requirement bore “a
demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for
which it was used.”78 According to the Court, “absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or
testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”79
As the language of Griggs indicates, the primary purpose of the
disparate impact theory is to remove barriers to employment
opportunity that disproportionately burden women or racial or ethnic
minorities.80 It is available to challenge both objective employment
standards, such as standardized tests, and also subjective practices,
such as job interviews, in which supervisors’ exercise of discretion has
a disparate impact.81 The theory has been used to challenge a wide
range of employment practices, including (although not always
successfully) policies against hiring persons with arrest or conviction
records, interviews, experience requirements, no-spouse rules, and
no-beard policies.82

75. Id. at 430.
76. Id. at 428.
77. Id. at 431.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 432.
80. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982) (noting the Court’s conclusion in
Griggs that in enacting Title VII, Congress’s primary objective was “to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees” (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–
30)).
81. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.02, at 251–53; see infra notes 173–77 and
accompanying text.
82. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.02, at 251.
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Since Griggs, a tripartite structure of proof has emerged for
83
disparate impact claims. A plaintiff must put forward a prima facie
case by identifying a particular employment practice that, although
facially neutral, has a disproportionate, adverse impact on a protected
group.84 Generally, plaintiffs bringing disparate impact claims must
not only show that a protected group is underrepresented in the
employer’s workforce, but also must identify the specific practice that
gives rise to the discrepancy.85 The defendant may then attempt to
rebut the prima facie case86 or else show, as an affirmative defense,
that the practice is “job related for the position in question and
87
consistent with business necessity.” Finally, if the employer proves
this defense, the plaintiff may yet prevail by showing that the
employer refuses to adopt an “alternative employment practice” that
would have a less-discriminatory effect.88 Such a showing undermines
the employer’s claim that the practice is a business necessity.89 It also
may suggest that the employer’s claim of business necessity is a
90
pretext for intentional discrimination.
C. Lower Court Challenges to Title VII’s Abrogation of State
Sovereign Immunity
Although the Supreme Court held in 1976 that Title VII
abrogated state sovereign immunity,91 lower courts heard new

83. Id. § 4.01, at 239. This structure of proof is now part of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k) (2000).
84. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.01, at 239.
85. Id. § 4.02, at 246–49. The exception is when “the plaintiff can prove that the elements of
an employer’s selection process are incapable of separation for analysis.” Id. at 246.
86. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 338–39 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
result and concurring in part) (“[T]he defendants . . . . may endeavor to impeach the reliability
of the [plaintiffs’] statistical evidence, . . . offer rebutting evidence, or . . . disparage . . . the
probative weight [that the] evidence should be accorded.”).
87. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.01, at 239. Title VII does not define “job related” or
“business necessity.” Id. at 242. Congress’s Interpretive Memorandum to accompany the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 states only that these terms retain their meaning prior to the Supreme
Court’s 1989 decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Id. § 4.03, at
285–86. In practice, courts have applied the standard with varying degrees of stringency. Id. at
289–93. That Congress, in codifying the theory, specifically rejected the Court’s weak
articulation of the standard in Wards Cove suggests that the required showing is fairly stringent.
Id. at 289.
88. Id. § 4.01, at 242–43.
89. Id. § 4.03, at 294.
90. Id. at 293–94.
91. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456–57 (1976).
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challenges to Title VII in the wake of the Court’s decisions
reinvigorating state sovereign immunity and contracting the scope of
Congress’s Section Five power. Following these decisions, three
federal courts of appeals have considered, and upheld, Title VII’s
abrogation of state sovereign immunity; two of them specifically
decided challenges to abrogation in the context of disparate impact
92
claims. The ways in which these courts reconciled the disparate
impact theory with the abrogation inquiry, however, are somewhat
troubling, because they may signal a narrowing of the theory’s scope.
All three courts held that Congress had extended Title VII to the
states in response to evidence of a pattern of discrimination in state
employment. To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit, in In re
Employment Discrimination Litigation Against Alabama93 cited the
EEOA’s legislative history, which “documented the troubling
94
persistence of race discrimination in public employment”; the court
also took notice of “this nation’s sad history of racial domination and
subordination.”95 Because the court was writing before Garrett, which
96
announced the rigorous record-review inquiry, this limited review of
Title VII’s legislative history is unsurprising. The Eighth Circuit, in
Okruhlik v. University of Arkansas,97 however, reached the same
result after Garrett. The court cited the same legislative history as had
the Eleventh Circuit and additionally cited the Senate’s floor
debates.98 It further noted that when Congress extended Title VII to
the states it was also gathering evidence regarding gender
discrimination for other pending civil rights provisions, including the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and Education Opportunity Act.99
The court therefore concluded that Congress had had before it

92. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in In re Employment Discrimination Litigation Against
Alabama involved challenges to a number of Alabama’s employment practices alleged to have a
disparate impact on African Americans. 198 F.3d 1305, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 1999). The claims the
Eighth Circuit considered in Okruhlik v. University of Arkansas included a female professor’s
allegation of disparate impact on the basis of sex. 255 F.3d 615, 620 (8th Cir. 2001). And the
Seventh Circuit in Nanda v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois evaluated a
professor’s disparate treatment suit alleging race, sex, and national-origin discrimination. 303
F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2002).
93. 198 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1999).
94. Id. at 1323.
95. Id.
96. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
97. 255 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 2001).
98. Id. at 625.
99. Id.
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evidence of a history and pattern of both race and gender
100
discrimination. The Seventh Circuit, in Nanda v. Board of Trustees
of the University of Illinois,101 followed Okruhlik in taking notice of
the other legislation pending before Congress when the EEOA was
enacted. Additionally, it found support in “the well-documented
history of gender [and race] discrimination in this Nation . . . that is
102
embodied in the Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence.”
The Eleventh and Eighth Circuits, the two courts of appeals to
consider state sovereign immunity challenges to the disparate impact
theory, applied the congruence and proportionality analysis in
somewhat different ways. The Eleventh Circuit characterized the
disparate impact theory as a remedy for covert intentional
discrimination that would be difficult to prove under the disparate
103
treatment theory. The court explained that “[alt]hough the plaintiff
is never explicitly required to demonstrate discriminatory motive, a
genuine finding of disparate impact can be highly probative of the
employer’s motive.”104 Therefore, the court concluded,
Our analysis of the mechanics of a disparate impact claim has led us
unavoidably to the conclusion that although the form of the
disparate impact inquiry differs from that used in a case challenging
state action directly under the Fourteenth Amendment, the core
injury targeted by both methods of analysis remains the same:
105
intentional discrimination.

The court thus found that Title VII’s disparate impact provision, as a
remedy for intentional discrimination that is difficult to prove, was a
106
congruent and proportional response to intentional discrimination.
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that “employment practices,
adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in
operation be functionally equivalent to [unconstitutional] intentional
discrimination . . . [and] may have effects that are indistinguishable

100.
101.
102.
103.
1999).
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 624.
303 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 830–31 (quoting Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d 927, 936 (7th Cir. 2000)).
In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1321–23 (11th Cir.
Id. at 1321.
Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1323–24.
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107
from intentionally discriminatory practices.” Therefore, the court
held, the disparate impact theory was a “‘prophylactic’ response to a
pattern of unconstitutional state action [that] is proportional and
108
congruent.”
The court did not explain precisely what this
conceptualization entails; the Supreme Court, in the opinion from
which this characterization of disparate impact is taken, indicated that
it may include both practices that perpetuate the effects of historical
discrimination and those that rely on unconscious stereotypes.109
Thus, both circuits were able to find a rationale, prior to the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Hibbs and Lane, for concluding that
Title VII’s disparate impact theory satisfied the congruence and
proportionality test. Neither court explored in any depth what effect
defining disparate impact in terms of intentional discrimination—
either as a remedy for intentional discrimination that is difficult to
prove, or as a remedy for conduct that is the “functional equivalent”
of intentional discrimination—would have on how the theory
operates. As discussed in Part III, there is some reason to think that
these conceptualizations, particularly the Eleventh Circuit’s, may
significantly limit the disparate impact theory’s reach.

II. THE RECORD-REVIEW INQUIRY
No court reviewing Title VII has yet performed an extensive
110
review of its legislative record. This Part shows that this record
satisfies the more deferential review shown to rights that receive
heightened scrutiny: Congress extended Title VII to the states in
response to evidence of race, gender, and national-origin
discrimination by state employers. This Part then turns to the recordreview inquiry itself and considers why the Court established this
second form of review in Hibbs. It concludes that the continued
viability of the state sovereign immunity doctrine required that it do
so: not only would the Garrett test’s skepticism be incongruous when
the rights involved have been judicially recognized as important, but
the test also would have put the Court in the awkward position of

107. Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 255 F.3d 615, 626 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987, 990 (1988)).
108. Id. at 626–27.
109. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988); see infra notes 173–
78 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 93–102 and accompanying text.
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having to disbelieve that the states have ever discriminated on the
basis of race, gender, or national origin.
A. Title VII’s Legislative Record
Review of Title VII’s legislative record reveals that when
Congress extended Title VII to the states it was responding to a
perceived nationwide pattern of unequal employment opportunity for
women and for racial and ethnic minorities—a pattern that resulted,
in significant part, from intentional discrimination. In extending Title
VII, Congress relied in large part on a report by the United States
Commission on Civil Rights111 regarding racial and national-origin
112
discrimination in state and local government employment.
According to the House Committee on Education and Labor, the
Commission’s report documented that “widespread discrimination
against minorities exists in State and local government employment,
and that the existence of this discrimination is perpetuated by the
presence of both institutional and overt discriminatory practices.”113
The Committee noted that “[t]he report cites widespread
perpetuation of past discriminatory practices through de facto
segregated job ladders, invalid selection techniques, and stereotyped
misconceptions by supervisors regarding minority group
capabilities.”114 Moreover, the report found that “employment
discrimination in State and local governments is more pervasive than
115
in the private sector.”
The Commission’s report, which studied state and local
government employment in seven large metropolitan areas, recorded
instances of intentional discrimination as well as discriminatory
attitudes among supervisors and institutionalized barriers to equal

111. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE . . . BY ALL THE PEOPLE: A
REPORT ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT
(1969).
112. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 17–18 (1971), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, S.
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 77–78 (1972) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT]. A second Commission report
cited by Congress found that Mexican Americans were underrepresented in law enforcement
agencies in the southwestern United States. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN
AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE SOUTHWEST 78–83 (1970).
113. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 17.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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opportunity. Although the Commission found that “blatant racism
openly admitted by a public official [was] atypical,” it encountered
“[s]egregated facilities, segregated work assignments, social ostracism,
116
and lack of courtesy” in government employment. It also observed
that government officials commonly expressed indifference to issues
of equal employment opportunity, particularly in the context of
promotions, and it further determined that administrators of meritbased promotion systems “frequently violated the merit principle and
practiced conscious, even institutionalized, discrimination.”117 The
report found that African Americans, and to a lesser extent Latinos,
faired poorly compared to their white counterparts in obtaining the
more desirable jobs in state government.118
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare also
reviewed a Census Bureau report showing that “while some progress
has been made toward bettering the economic position of the
Nation’s black population, the avowed goal of social and economic
equality is not yet anywhere near a reality.”119 According to the
report, African Americans in 1970 were “concentrated in the lowerpaying, less prestigious positions in industry and [were] largely
precluded from advancement to the higher paid, more prestigious
120
positions.” The unemployment rate for African Americans was also
considerably higher than that of whites.121 The report observed that
average pay among Latinos was also lower than for whites and that
122
Latinos had higher rates of unemployment than whites. On the basis
of all of these findings, Congress was justified in concluding that it
was faced with a pervasive problem of state race and national-origin
discrimination.
Congress also had before it evidence regarding gender-based
employment discrimination. Research conducted by the Department

116. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 111, at 61.
117. Id. at 64.
118. The report noted that African Americans were “noticeably absent from managerial and
professional jobs” except in a few fields, notably health and welfare. Latinos, although more
successful in obtaining higher-level positions than African Americans (who held the majority of
laborer and other low-level positions), had been “less successful than majority group members.”
Id. at 118–19.
119. S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 6 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT, supra note 112, at 415.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 6–7.
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of Labor’s Women’s Bureau showed that women received
substantially lower salaries than their male counterparts for
123
comparable work. Moreover, far fewer women had earnings in the
124
The House
highest pay bracket recognized in the survey.
Committee on Education and Labor concluded that “[w]omen are
subject to economic deprivation as a class. Their self-fulfillment and
development is [sic] frustrated because of their sex. Numerous studies
have shown that women are placed in the less challenging, the less
responsible and the less remunerative positions on the basis of their
sex alone.”125 Congress, on the basis of this evidence, concluded that
“blatantly disparate treatment” persisted in employment,126 but did
not draw specific conclusions about state governments.127
Three aspects of the Court’s review of the FMLA’s legislative
record in Hibbs are particularly relevant in assessing the adequacy of
Title VII’s legislative record. First, the Court expanded the types of
evidence that it would recognize as suggestive of discrimination. It
cited approvingly statistical evidence of disparities, such as research
indicating that many private employers offered family leave only to
female employees; under the Garrett test, such evidence would be

123. Id. at 7.
124. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 4 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT, supra note 112, at 2140.
125. Id. The Committee did not introduce these “numerous studies” into the legislative
record.
126. Id. at 64. The Committee noted that this discrimination “is particularly objectionable in
view of the fact that Title VII has specifically prohibited sex discrimination since its enactment
in 1964.” Id. at 64–65.
127. Thus, Title VII’s legislative record contained less evidence regarding gender
discrimination than regarding racial and national-origin discrimination. As the Eighth Circuit
noted, however, the same Congress that enacted the EEOA also passed the ERA. See supra
notes 99–102 and accompanying text. The Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the
Senate Judiciary Committee held three days of hearings on the ERA in 1970, during which it
“received testimony from 42 witnesses, received 75 additional insertions of material, and
compiled a hearing record of almost 800 pages.” S. REP. NO. 92-689, at 4 (1972). The full
Committee subsequently heard additional testimony. Id. In its report on the ERA, the Judiciary
Committee cited examples of state gender discrimination, including the persistence of
“protective” labor laws that barred women from performing certain tasks or holding certain
positions. Id. at 9. Based upon this and other evidence, the Committee stated that “[s]ex
discrimination is clearly present even in government employment.” Id. It noted that women
disproportionately occupied the lowest grades of federal civil service employment; although
women filled 62 percent of the lower four employment grades, they constituted only 2.5 percent
of the highest four grades. Id. Although the Supreme Court has never indicated whether
evidence compiled for contemporaneous legislative action can be considered in the recordreview inquiry, the Eighth Circuit’s decision to take note of the legislative record of the ERA
seems reasonable.
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irrelevant both because it does not offer direct evidence of
unconstitutional conduct and because it does not directly implicate
128
state-government conduct. This suggests that, in extending Title
VII, Congress was justified in relying not only upon direct evidence of
intentional discrimination by state governments, but also upon the
voluminous numerical data it had collected regarding segregation and
disparities in both government and private-sector employment. In
particular, Congress justifiably relied upon data showing that female
employees were paid less than men and that African-American
employees tended to hold lower-paying and less-prestigious positions
than white workers.
Second, the Court in Hibbs permitted Congress to draw
129
inferences about discrimination from the data before it. Its review
of maternity-leave statutes revealed that only eleven states offered
male and female employees different amounts of leave. Similarly, its
review of family-leave statutes showed that only seven states offered
childcare leave to women but not to men.130 A number of states,
however, did not guarantee family leave to any employees, relying
instead on voluntary or discretionary leave programs, and Congress
had received evidence that such discretionary policies could “leave[]
131
‘employees open to discretionary and possibly unequal treatment.’”
The Court permitted Congress to infer, from this potential for
discrimination, that “even where state laws and policies are not
facially discriminatory, they [are] applied in discriminatory ways.”132

128. The Court connected this private-sector data to state employment by citing a “50-state
survey also before Congress [that] demonstrated that ‘[t]he proportion and construction of leave
policies available to public sector employees differs little from those offered private sector
employees.’” Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 n.3 (2003) (quoting The
Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on LaborManagement Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the H. Comm. on Education
and Labor, 99th Cong. 33 (1986) (statement of Meryl Frank, director of the Yale Bush Center
Infant Care Leave Project)).
129. The Hibbs opinion on several occasions expressed deference toward, or even approval
of, the inferences Congress had drawn from the evidence before it. See id. at 734 (“Congress
could reasonably conclude that such discretionary family-leave programs would do little to
combat the stereotypes about the roles of male and female employees . . . .”); id. (“[F]our states
provided leave only through administrative regulations or personnel policies, which Congress
could reasonably conclude offered significantly less firm protection than a federal law.”).
130. Id. at 733–34.
131. Id. at 732–33 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 2, at 10–11 (1993), as reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 18).
132. Id. at 732. The Court indicated that this inference was justified because Congress had
heard testimony that “[t]he lack of uniform parental and medical leave policies in the work
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This deference to congressional inferences is important for Title VII.
In extending Title VII to the states, Congress inferred a broad pattern
of discrimination by combining documented instances of intentional
discrimination by state governments with extensive numerical
evidence of race- and gender-based disparities in pay and promotions.
The Court in Hibbs approved this kind of legislative reasoning.
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, the Court in Hibbs
concluded that its own gender-discrimination jurisprudence could
provide evidence of a history and pattern of state gender
discrimination.133 Because Title VII targets race, gender, and nationalorigin discrimination, all of which receive heightened scrutiny under
134
the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, this doctrinal
shift has great import for Title VII. The Court specifically indicated in
Hibbs that it would review Title VII in the context of its prior cases:
after reviewing its gender-discrimination jurisprudence, the Court
concluded that “Congress responded to this history of discrimination
by abrogating States’ sovereign immunity in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.”135 When the substantial legislative record of state
discrimination is read against the backdrop of the Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence, Title VII is on solid ground.
B. The Need for Two Tiers of Record Review
After Hibbs, there are two forms of record-review inquiry: one
for rights that receive only rational basis review and another for rights
that receive heightened scrutiny. This revision of the sovereign
immunity doctrine was necessary because the Garrett record-review
inquiry is inadequate when applied to rights that receive heightened
scrutiny. In several of its recent federalism cases, the Court has
indicated that at least certain key antidiscrimination statutes, such as

place has created an environment where [sex] discrimination is rampant.” Id. (quoting The
Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family,
Drugs and Alcoholism of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., pt. 2, at
170 (testimony of Peggy Montes, Mayor’s Commission on Women’s Affairs, City of Chicago)
(alteration in original)).
133. The Court had also looked to its own jurisprudence in Kimel and Garrett, but in those
cases the result of this inquiry was to confirm that Congress was attempting to provide state
employees with far more protection than the Court would offer them under the Equal
Protection Clause. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.
134. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 9.1, at 645.
135. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729.
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the Voting Rights Act, validly abrogate state sovereign immunity.
In Garrett, however, the Court established a doctrinal test that was
flawed in two ways. First, the test is weighted too heavily against
abrogation, perhaps making abrogation impossible even when the
legislation under review is truly responsive to a history and pattern of
discrimination. Second, applied to a statute like Title VII, the test
would put the Court in the politically and intellectually awkward
position of doubting that the states had ever been involved in
pervasive racial, gender, and national-origin discrimination.
First, the Garrett record review prevents Congress from offering
additional protection to rights that the Court has decreed should
receive only minimal scrutiny. Thus, although the test is neutral on its
face—it merely inquires whether Congress documented a pattern of
state violations of the specific constitutional right before attempting
to abrogate state sovereign immunity—in effect it would invalidate
most legislation protecting rights that receive only rational basis
review. Although the Court has claimed that the Garrett test would be
easier to satisfy for rights that receive heightened scrutiny,137 in
practice heightened scrutiny would only make it more likely that
apparently discriminatory conduct really represented unconstitutional
conduct. It would not relieve Congress’s enormous burden of
documenting a sufficiently large number of incidents of
discrimination such that the Court would feel comfortable inferring a
pattern.
The problem with the Garrett inquiry is that there is no logical
connection between a statute’s societal importance and the strength
of its legislative record. Congress may have been entirely justified in
enacting a core antidiscrimination statute and yet failed to place in
the legislative record sufficiently detailed evidence with which the
138
139
Court could “check Congress’s homework” years later. The
136. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001) (comparing the
ADA unfavorably to the Voting Rights Act (VRA)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
532–33 (1997) (comparing RFRA unfavorably to the VRA).
137. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (“[G]ender discrimination . . . triggers a heightened level of
scrutiny. . . . [Thus] it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional
violations.”).
138. This phrase is Justice Scalia’s description of the congruence and proportionality test.
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 558 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Cf. Holmes v. Marion County, 349 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir. 2003) (Easterbrook, J.)
(“Although the Supreme Court has consistently limited its review to the legislative record we
nonetheless assume that, if the history were written elsewhere for all to see, as the history of
race and sex discrimination is, then the lack of a legislative record would not matter. . . .
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Garrett test is a useful tool with which to constrain congressional
decisionmaking. But if, as the Court had suggested, the Section Five
power should be more expansive when Congress acts to remedy
racial, gender, and national-origin discrimination, the Court needed a
different doctrinal tool with which to review these statutes. The Court
provided this tool in Hibbs by establishing a more lenient form of
record-review inquiry.
Second, the Garrett test poses a question that the Court would
find difficult to ask with regard to race, gender, or national-origin
discrimination: whether Congress had a sufficient basis for believing
140
that states are responsible for unconstitutional discrimination. It
was politically and doctrinally acceptable in Garrett for the Court to
engage in a rigorous and highly skeptical review of Congress’s
assertion that states discriminate against disabled workers.141 It was
142
also acceptable for it to speak of rational disability discrimination
and to doubt the contention that states’ refusal to accommodate the
disabled in public facilities bears on the question of whether they
discriminate against the disabled in the workplace.143 With a statute
aimed at race, gender, or national-origin discrimination, however,
such doctrinal skepticism would be troubling; state discrimination
against women and racial and ethnic minorities is unquestionably part
of this nation’s history. The Hibbs test, by reviewing the legislative
record more generously and taking notice of equal protection
jurisprudence, relieves the Court of having to ask whether Congress
has a basis for believing that racial, gender, or national-origin
discrimination are really problems in need of a remedy.

Legislative power under § 5 depends on the state of the world, not the state of the
Congressional Record.” (citation omitted)).
140. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
141. Professor Post argues that Hibbs was intended to avoid the political controversy that
would have resulted from invalidation of Title VII’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity:
In the years since Boerne the Court has used its new enforcement model of Section 5
power primarily to invalidate statutes of relatively low political salience. The nation’s
conviction that an essential mission of the federal government is the prevention of
racial and gender discrimination . . . . would be forcefully challenged were the Court
to hold that important dimensions of Title VII were beyond Congress’s Section 5
power.
Post, supra note 6, at 22–23. Post is likely right about the political stakes. The focus in this Note,
however, is on the doctrinal incongruity of doubting, and requiring Congress to prove, that the
states ever practiced racial, gender, and national-origin discrimination.
142. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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III. TITLE VII DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY’S CONGRUENCE AND
PROPORTIONALITY
After Hibbs and Lane, Congress may use its Section Five power
to provide broad remedies for discrimination against women and
racial and ethnic minorities, and it has significant discretion in
selecting those remedies. This Part argues that Title VII’s disparate
impact theory is within Congress’s Section Five power to enact
prophylactic legislation and that a disparate impact-based remedy is
congruent and proportional even when not narrowly defined as
merely a remedy for hard-to-prove intentional discrimination. First,
this Part shows that Hibbs recognized that forms of discrimination
other than intentional constitutional violations are legitimate targets
of Section Five legislation, and it explains that, under this reasoning,
prohibiting employment practices that have a disparate impact is a
legitimate congressional goal. It then shows that disparate impact is
similar to the remedies found congruent and proportional in Hibbs
and Lane. Finally, it examines the Supreme Court’s treatment of the
disparate impact theory outside the state sovereign immunity context
and argues that a broad conception of disparate impact, not defined
merely as a remedy for covert intentional discrimination, is essential
if the theory is to achieve its remedial purposes.
A. Hibbs and Forms of Discrimination
In Hibbs, the Court affirmed that even gender discrimination
that would not be unconstitutional can be worthy of legislative
response; Hibbs authorizes Congress to target neutral practices that
have a disparate impact. The Court took seriously—and affirmed that
Congress may target with its Section Five power—entrenched social
roles and unexamined attitudes that have tangible effects on women’s
employment, even if those effects are only remotely connected to
unconstitutional discrimination:
Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel
stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men.
Because employers continued to regard the family as the woman’s
domain, they often denied men similar accommodations or
discouraged them from taking leave. These mutually reinforcing
stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that
forced women to continue to assume the role of primary family
caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical views about
women’s commitment to work and their value as employees. Those
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perceptions, in turn, Congress reasoned, lead to subtle
discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case
144
basis.

It is not clear how the Court’s “subtle discrimination” is related to
intentional discrimination; “subtle” is not a word normally used to
describe the overt intent to discriminate that the Court requires to
establish an equal protection violation.145 Assuming that the Court is
referring to intentional discrimination, however, the line of causation
through which “stereotypes about women’s domestic roles” produce
this subtle discrimination is, as the Court described it in Hibbs,
remarkably long. Thus, even if intentional discrimination is the
Court’s ultimate concern, Congress may address the underlying social
processes that produce it rather than just punishing it after it occurs.146
Of course, beginning with City of Boerne, the Court indicated
that the congruence and proportionality test would afford Congress
greater legislative flexibility to deter or remedy violations of the most
important rights: “The appropriateness of remedial measures must be
considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures appropriate
to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another,
lesser one.”147 Thus, when Congress acts to deter or remedy violations
of a right that receives heightened scrutiny, it should be able to enact
a statute that prohibits more constitutional conduct than when it acts
to protect a right that receives only rational basis review. Before
Hibbs, however, the Court had not made clear how much more
authority Congress would have. The Court’s discussion of genderbased stereotypes in Hibbs reveals how much more authority
Congress possesses when heightened scrutiny is implicated. The
congruence and proportionality test requires that the ultimate target
of Section Five legislation be intentional discrimination. After Hibbs,
however, Congress may deter this discrimination by targeting its roots
in stereotypes and unconscious attitudes.

144. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
145. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995)
(explaining that disparate treatment analysis fails to reflect accurately the psychological
processes that produce most “intentional” discrimination).
146. In Lane, the Court seemed to reaffirm this principle: “When Congress seeks to remedy
or prevent unconstitutional discrimination, § 5 authorizes it to enact prophylactic legislation
proscribing practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic
objectives of the Equal Protection Clause.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004).
147. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (citation omitted).
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Moreover, Hibbs strongly indicates that the remedy need not be
aimed, even indirectly, at intentional discrimination. The Court made
clear that Congress prevents employers from offering no family leave
at all, a practice that would have a disparate impact on women:
[I]n light of the evidence before Congress, a statute mirroring Title
VII that simply mandated gender equality in the administration of
leave benefits, would not have achieved Congress’ remedial object.
Such a law would allow States to provide for no family leave at all.
Where “[t]wo-thirds of the nonprofessional caregivers for older,
chronically ill, or disabled persons are working women,” and state
practices continue to reinforce the stereotype of women as
caregivers, such a policy would exclude far more women than men
148
from the workplace.

There is no indication, in this passage, that the target of the remedy
must be intentional discrimination, even via a long causal chain. If
Congress perceives that failure to provide family leave will
disproportionately affect female employees, it may provide a remedy.
Thus, Hibbs authorizes Congress to target either the deep roots
of intentional discrimination or practices with a disparate impact.
Under either reading, Hibbs announces a remarkably expansive
congruence and proportionality standard that has great significance
for Title VII’s disparate impact theory. Disparate impact aims at
149
effects and is agnostic about the motivations behind them. Thus,
under a more cramped congruence and proportionality analysis, this
150
lack of concern on intent would be a significant shortcoming. Under
the more expansive analysis outlined in Hibbs, however, legislation
aimed at protecting a right that receives heightened scrutiny need not
directly target unconstitutional conduct. Just as the FMLA’s familyleave provision was not, on its face, concerned with remedying
intentional (gender-based discriminatory) conduct, but rather
targeted conduct far down the line of causation, Title VII’s disparate
impact provision need not aim at intentional discrimination to be a
congruent and proportional remedy. Although surely there must be
some limits to the attenuation of the connection, Hibbs shows that
these limits will not be strict: so long as the theory targets practices
148. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738 (citation omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 1, at 24
(1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 18).
149. See infra Part III.C.
150. Indeed, the Court in Garrett rejected disparate impact liability as a remedy for
disability discrimination. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372–73 (2001).
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that are connected in some way to intentional discrimination, the
151
congruence-and-proportionality requirement will be satisfied.
So even if the Hibbs congruence-and-proportionality
requirement mandates conceptualizing disparate impact in a way that
ties it to intentional discrimination, the connection can be so loose
that it would not alter how the theory functions in practice. Hibbs
thus provides a better rationale for disparate impact than either the
Eleventh or Eighth Circuit could offer under the reasoning of the
152
Supreme Court’s earlier Section Five decisions. The Eleventh
Circuit’s conception of disparate impact as a remedy for intentional
discrimination that would be difficult for plaintiffs to prove is far
more limiting. Tying disparate impact so tightly to intentional
discrimination risks limiting disparate impact’s usefulness in
challenging practices that impose barriers through indifference,
thoughtlessness, and unconscious stereotypes. Under the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach, courts may feel compelled to dismiss disparate
impact claims that do not bear the “scent” of covert intentional
discrimination.153 In contrast, the Eighth Circuit’s conceptualization of

151. There is no conflict between this expansive view of Congress’s power to target conduct
that is not itself unconstitutional and the Court’s rejection of disparate impact liability under the
Equal Protection Clause. When the Court rejected disparate impact liability under equal
protection in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), it recognized that the theory would
continue to be available through Title VII. See id. at 239 (“We have never held that the
constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to
the standards applicable under Title VII . . . .”). Thus, Davis holds only that disparate impact is
not authorized by Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment and does not address whether
Congress may provide for disparate impact liability pursuant to its Section Five power. Indeed,
the very existence of the congruence and proportionality test reveals that Section One and
Section Five are not coextensive; if they were, there would be no reason to measure how much
conduct Congress may prohibit that would not be unconstitutional under Section One. See City
of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (“Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can
fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct
which is not itself unconstitutional . . . .”). Moreover, the Court was concerned in Davis that
disparate impact liability could have dramatic, unforeseen societal consequences. See 426 U.S. at
248 (concluding that the effects of recognizing a disparate impact theory “would be far reaching
and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare,
public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes” that disproportionately affect African
Americans). This concern does not arise with regard to disparate impact liability under Title
VII, which applies only in the employment context and has well-defined statutory parameters.
See supra Part I.B.
152. See supra notes 103–09 and accompanying text.
153. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 452 (2000) (“If the
conclusion of the Eleventh Circuit were taken seriously, it would suggest a fundamental
reworking of an important area of Title VII jurisprudence.”). Professor Jolls, however, argues
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disparate impact as the “functional equivalent” of intentional
discrimination is less precise and, thus, likely would narrow the
disparate impact theory less dramatically than would the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach. It faces a similar problem, however, in that it
produces an expectation that disparate impact claims will be similar
to claims of intentional discrimination. The disparate impact theory,
instead, has always permitted challenges so long as a practice
produces a disparate impact, even when an employer’s motivations
appear entirely innocent.154 A theory targeting practices that are the
functional equivalent of intentional discrimination is not as broad or
as generally applicable as a theory that targets all disproportionately
adverse effects.
B. The Disparate Impact Remedy Compared with the FMLA and
Title II of the ADA
In addition to falling within the broad language of the Hibbs
opinion, Title VII’s disparate impact theory is similar, in three key
respects, to the remedies upheld in Hibbs and Lane. First, like the
FMLA’s family-leave provision and the reasonable accommodation
mandated by Title II of the ADA, disparate impact does not punish
intentional discrimination, but rather imposes a duty on employers to
ensure that protected groups are not disproportionately burdened by
facially neutral policies. The Supreme Court explained in Hibbs that
the family-leave requirement protected women from being harmed
disproportionately by the absence of employer-provided leave
policies.155 Congress was justified in imposing a requirement that
employers offer their employees twelve weeks of leave as prophylaxis
for the disparate impact that neutral leave policies would have on
female employees. Disparate impact liability would target the same
adverse effects as the FMLA’s leave policy, but in a less-intrusive
way—by prohibiting the discriminatory policies directly rather than
by setting a standard that overrides them. If Congress may take the
more-intrusive step of imposing a mandatory leave policy to guard
against leave policies that would have a disparate impact on women,

that understanding disparate impact as a remedy for covert discrimination is compatible with a
“robust conception” of the theory. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 642, 675 (2001).
154. See infra Part III.C.
155. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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it should be able to take the less-intrusive step of imposing liability on
employers who employ such policies.
Moreover, disparate impact is closely aligned with the reasonable
accommodation upheld in Lane. Both remedies impose a duty overand-above the baseline duty to refrain from intentionally
discriminating. Title II of the ADA requires governments to take
affirmative steps to ease disabled persons’ access to courthouses; it
does not inquire whether governments refrain from taking such steps
out of discriminatory animus toward the disabled. Title II is thus
agnostic toward questions of intent and focuses, instead, on effects in
much the same way as disparate impact. Indeed, the Court in Lane
acknowledged that the failure to accommodate and the maintenance
of policies that have a disparate impact are closely related problems:
“[F]ailure to accommodate persons with disabilities will often have
156
the same practical effect as outright exclusion.”
Second, like both the FMLA’s family-leave provision and Title II
of the ADA’s reasonable-accommodation requirement, disparate
impact under Title VII displays legislative crafting that limits the
burden it imposes. In Hibbs, the Court noted with approval a number
of statutory limitations on the FMLA’s reach. These included the
limited definition of covered employees; the requirement that
employees give advance notice of foreseeable leave requests; the
requirement that a health-care provider certify the need for leave;
and the twelve-week limit on leave, which was a “middle ground”
157
between the needs of employees and employers. Moreover, the
damages available were “strictly defined and measured by actual
158
monetary losses.” Similarly, in Lane, the Court emphasized that
“[t]he remedy Congress chose is nevertheless a limited one.”159
Reasonable accommodation “would not fundamentally alter the
nature of the service provided,” and governments are not required to
make accommodations that “would impose an undue financial or
160
administrative burden.”
The disparate impact theory, as codified, incorporates the
judicially developed tripartite structure of proof, including the
business necessity defense, as well as the requirement that plaintiffs

156. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004).
157. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738–39 (2003).
158. Id. at 740.
159. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531.
160. Id. at 532.
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identify the specific employment practice responsible for the
161
disparate impact. These limitations ensure that disparate impact
liability is only imposed upon employers who refuse to abandon
employment practices that clearly burden women or racial or ethnic
minorities disproportionately. Moreover, disparate impact plaintiffs
may not recover compensatory or punitive damages, but instead are
162
limited to backpay, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief. This is a
further indication that the theory is tailored to accomplish important
ends without imposing an excessive burden on employers, who may
not have been aware initially of their policies’ discriminatory effects.
Finally, disparate impact, like the remedies in Hibbs and Lane,
responds to the failure of prior efforts. The Court emphasized in both
cases that more extensive remedies are justified by the failure of more
limited previous efforts. In Hibbs, it noted that Congress had enacted
the FMLA in the face of evidence that Title VII and the Pregnancy
Disability Act had failed to address workplace gender discrimination
fully: “Congress again confronted a ‘difficult and intractable
proble[m]’ where previous legislative attempts had failed. Such
163
problems may justify added prophylactic measures in response.”
Referring to this passage, the Court noted in Lane that Congress had
enacted the ADA in the face of “considerable evidence of the
shortcomings of previous legislative responses.”164 Title VII’s
disparate impact theory, like the FMLA and Title II of the ADA, is
an “added prophylactic measure” that was created in response to the
failures of prior efforts. The Court itself created the remedy in
response to evidence that employment practices imposing significant
barriers to workplace equality were escaping the reach of Title VII’s
disparate treatment theory.165 In sum, the disparate impact theory is
similar in nature, scope, and purpose to the remedies upheld in Hibbs
and Lane.
C. The Value of a Broadly Defined Disparate Impact Theory
Although the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits were able to find a
doctrinal basis for upholding the disparate impact theory before

161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000); see supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text.
162. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.01, at 241.
163. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
164. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531.
165. See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text.
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Hibbs and Lane, they did so by defining the theory in terms of
intentional discrimination; the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, in
particular, seemed to reduce the theory to an “evidentiary dragnet”
166
for detecting hidden intentional discrimination. As shown by the
three decades of Supreme Court precedent dealing with disparate
impact claims, the theory can only provide an effective remedy if it is
broadly defined. The disparate impact theory is broad enough to
reach a range of employment practices that, although outside the
scope of the disparate treatment theory, nevertheless impose
substantial barriers to equal employment opportunity. In particular,
disparate impact has been used to target arbitrary employment
practices that impose barriers to equal opportunity and practices that
result from unconscious bias. Only if disparate impact has the same
broad reach under Congress’s Section Five Power will the theory be a
viable remedy for state employees. Moreover, a narrow disparate
impact theory, conceived of solely as a remedy for intentional
discrimination, would be unworkable in practice.
From its inception, the disparate impact theory has been
concerned with “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on
167
the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.” Since
Griggs, the theory has been important in cases involving arbitrary
barriers in which probing for discriminatory animus would be neither
practical nor meaningful. For example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson,168 a
female applicant for a prison-guard position used the disparate
impact theory to challenge statutory height and weight requirements

166. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 518 (2003) (“[T]here has long been a dispute over whether disparate impact
doctrine is an evidentiary dragnet designed to discover hidden instances of intentional
discrimination or a more aggressive attempt to dismantle racial hierarchies regardless of
whether anything like intentional discrimination is present.”); supra Part I.C.
167. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (emphasis added). The Court
subsequently reaffirmed this conception of the theory in Connecticut v. Teal. See 457 U.S. 440,
451 (1982) (“Title VII strives to achieve equality of opportunity by rooting out ‘artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary’ employer-created barriers to professional development that have a
discriminatory impact upon individuals.”). This is not to say, however, that either the Court or
Congress has ever settled upon a single conception of the theory. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra
note 2, § 4.01, at 243 (noting that the “disparate impact theory remains a complicated and
confusing doctrine”). Nevertheless, the conception of disparate impact as a means of achieving
equal employment opportunity is a prominent one that is traceable to the theory’s origins in
Griggs.
168. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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169
that excluded many women, but almost no men. Because it was a
disparate impact claim, the Court did not have to attempt to discern
the motives of the Alabama legislators who had enacted these
requirements. Not only would such an inquiry have been difficult, but
it also would not have contributed much. In the face of evidence that
the height and weight requirements would preclude more than 40
percent of women, but less than one percent of men, from serving as
prison guards,170 it matters little whether the legislature intended to
exclude women or simply acted without considering the
disproportionate burden these requirements would impose. What the
plaintiff in Dothard sought, and won, was a new policy that would
measure the characteristics that prison guards must possess without
171
unnecessarily screening out qualified female applicants. Because the
purpose of the litigation was to remove barriers to equal employment
rather than to punish the employer for discriminating, there was little
reason to require proof that the state had acted out of discriminatory
motives once the existence of the barriers was established.172 This
salutary change in policy was only possible because the disparate
impact theory is not tethered to considerations of intent and can
reach practices that impose arbitrary, rather than intentional,
barriers.
A broad disparate impact theory is also important because it can
reach practices that, although imposing significant barriers to
workplace equality, reflect unconscious bias rather than volitional
discriminatory animus (and thus fall outside the ambit of disparate
treatment). In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,173 an African-

169. Id. at 323–24, 329–30 & n.12. The five-foot-two-inch height requirement would have
excluded 33.29 percent of the state’s female population but only 2.35 percent of men. Id.
Similarly, the 120-pound weight requirement would have prevented 22.29 percent of women,
but only 3.63 percent of men, from working as guards. Id.
170. The two standards, when combined, would have excluded 41.13 percent of women in
the state but less than 1 percent of men. Id.
171. For example, the Court held that a test that more directly measures strength would
satisfy Title VII. Id. at 332.
172. One of the Court’s misgivings about disparate impact seems to be that it “would result
in employers being potentially liable for ‘the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to
statistical imbalances in the composition of their work forces.’” Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
992 (1988) (plurality opinion)). The urge to link disparate impact to intentional discrimination
may reflect the Court’s concern that disparate impact should not punish “innocent” employers.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
173. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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American bank employee was repeatedly passed over for supervisory
174
positions in favor of white employees; the bank had never
developed formal criteria for evaluating candidates for promotion,
175
relying instead upon supervisors’ subjective assessments. Because
the bank had been able to offer nondiscriminatory reasons for each of
its promotion decisions, the lower courts had dismissed the plaintiff’s
176
Title VII disparate treatment claims. The Supreme Court held,
however, that the plaintiff could proceed under the disparate impact
theory. Although subjective employment practices are not themselves
objectionable, the Court explained, they may violate Title VII if their
effects are “functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.”177
Even if supervisors are not motivated by discriminatory animus in
selecting candidates for promotion, unstructured subjective hiring
practices may permit unconscious biases to distort the supervisors’
assessments:
[E]ven if one assumed that [intentional] discrimination can be
adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis, the
problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain.
In this case, for example, petitioner was apparently told at one point
that the teller position was a big responsibility with “a lot of
money . . . for blacks to have to count.” Such remarks may not prove
discriminatory intent, but they do suggest a lingering form of the
problem that Title VII was enacted to combat. If an employer’s
undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has precisely the
same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional
discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title VII’s proscription
178
against discriminatory actions should not apply.

The Court’s explicit recognition of the role of unconscious bias in
employment decisions reveals the inadequacy of conceptions of
disparate impact that view it as merely a remedy for covert
intentional discrimination. As the Court described it, what was at
work in Watson was not intentional discrimination, covert or
otherwise. Rather, it was a neutral practice that nonetheless worked
to exclude African Americans disproportionately from the
supervisory ranks because it allowed unconscious biases to operate

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 982.
Id.
Id. at 983–84.
Id. at 987.
Id. at 990–91 (citation omitted).
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unchecked. Thus, if courts had to limit disparate impact to cases of
covert discrimination, cases like Watson might not present valid Title
VII claims.
In addition to these conceptual reasons for a broad disparate
impact theory, there are also practical reasons not to conceive of
disparate impact as merely a remedy for covert intentional
discrimination. Although states may raise Eleventh Amendment
defenses early, often it will not be clear until well into the litigation
process whether a facially neutral practice is the product of
discriminatory animus. In Watson, for example, the district court
conducted a full trial on the plaintiff’s disparate treatment claims
before concluding that no intentional discrimination had occurred.179
Thus, courts hearing disparate impact cases against state employers
would have to defer ruling on Eleventh Amendment defenses until
after hearing sufficient evidence from which to determine whether
covert intentional discrimination was at work. It would be an
enormous waste of judicial resources, and would be unfair to litigants,
to let cases proceed to discovery, or even to trial, before deciding
whether they should even have been brought in the first place.
Although the Eleventh Circuit made clear that it would not require
case-by-case findings of intent,180 there is no reason to suppose that
other courts adopting its approach would not demand proof of intent
in each individual case.181
Courts also would have to make findings regarding intent on the
basis of evidence ill-suited to the inquiry. The structure of proof in
disparate impact cases aims to determine the effects of employment
practices on protected groups and to assess whether these practices
179. Id. at 983–84.
180. In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1322 (11th Cir.
1999).
181. An alternate reading of the Eleventh Circuit’s conception of disparate impact is that
the court did not envision a case-by-case assessment of whether facially neutral practices reflect
covert intent to discriminate. Rather, the court may have been suggesting that because some
facially neutral practices that disproportionately burden protected groups are undoubtedly the
product of discriminatory animus, and because it would be difficult in practice to identify these
cases, the disparate impact theory should be available in all cases. This reading suggests a much
broader conception of the theory. Because it permits disparate impact liability for many facially
neutral practices that are not actually the product of intentional discrimination, it is a far
broader prophylactic ban than one that only ferrets out the intentional discrimination lurking
behind apparently neutral practices. Understood in this way, the Eleventh Circuit’s conception
may, therefore, exceed the narrow definition of Congress’s Section Five power outlined in
Garrett. Of course, it would fit comfortably within the Section Five power as conceived after
Hibbs and Lane.
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182
are justified. It does not offer the opportunity to delve into
employers’ motives. In the course of hearing evidence about effects
and justifications, however, courts hearing disparate impact claims
would have to make findings as to whether a covert intent to
discriminate was at work. The disparate treatment theory is better
suited to this inquiry. Disparate impact’s structure of proof should be
reserved for the inquiry it was designed to address—assessing
whether neutral employment practices are justified—and should not
be used to attempt to root out intentional discrimination.

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hibbs and Lane give flesh to
the suggestion in earlier cases that Congress has the power to respond
in meaningful ways to racial, gender, and national-origin
discrimination by state governments. In announcing a more nuanced
and flexible standard for reviewing the legislative record and
describing a more expansive view of Congress’s power to legislate
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, these cases put
Title VII’s disparate impact theory on much more solid doctrinal
ground. It is now clear that the disparate impact theory can reach a
wide range of state-government employment practices that, although
constitutional, pose barriers to equal employment opportunity.
The disparate impact theory is important both practically and
symbolically. Although disparate impact cases are relatively
infrequent,183 the theory remains an important tool with which to
184
challenge arbitrary barriers to equal employment opportunity. It
also embodies society’s commitment to opening workplaces to all
persons, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender. For some time, it
appeared that the Supreme Court would elevate the “dignity” of the
states above Congress’s power to apply this core equal protection
principle in state government workplaces. The Court has finally

182. See supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text.
183. See Krieger, supra note 145, at 1162 n.3 (noting that far more disparate treatment
claims than disparate impact claims are brought each year).
184. See Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s
Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 597, 600 (2004) (noting that
“disparate impact litigation is not making a major impact in this new century” but arguing that
“perhaps [the] most important[] reason that disparate impact litigation has been languishing is
that its potential is not often appreciated by the practicing bar”).
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reaffirmed in Hibbs and Lane, however, that it shares at least this
basic commitment to equality.

